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COSTS MATTER:  EFFECTIVE AIR QUALITY REGULATION IN A 
RISKY WORLD 
WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I want to present an argument that agencies should consider costs in 
making complicated scientific regulatory decisions that is somewhat different 
from the standard argument in support of a cost-benefit approach.  Although I 
think what I am saying should have general application, I will focus 
particularly on the establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
by the Environmental Protection Agency.1  In this article, I will argue both that 
EPA should consider costs, in the particular sense that I am mentioning, and 
that the statute allows this. 
Let me begin by saying that in a world of limited resources, some type of 
cost consideration is, as we all know, inevitable.  Statements that costs should 
not be considered in a particular context really mean that the cost-benefit 
decision reached by one social entity should not be second-guessed by another.  
The question thus becomes which organ of government should consider costs, 
and at what point in the regulatory process.  I concede there is a substantial 
argument that Congress can legitimately decide that certain social goals are 
worth any likely cost of achieving them, and that Congress can in consequence 
forbid the second-guessing of that judgment in the regulatory process.  
However, even if we concede that point, there is still a very strong argument 
 
* Mr. Pedersen is an independent practitioner in Washington D.C.  Bill Pedersen represents 
clients in litigating, rulemaking, and permit and enforcement proceedings under the Clean Air 
Act, including “new source review” and “Title V” rules and permits, hazardous air pollutant 
control, state implementation plans, and regulation of fuels and motor vehicles.  He received his 
B.A. from Harvard University, and his LL.B. from Harvard Law School. 
  This article was written before the Supreme Court’s decision in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Association, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001) and has not been updated to reflect that decision.  
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 7409; Clean Air Act § 109.  The purpose of this section is to have the EPA 
Administrator set the national ambient air quality standards for criteria air pollutants and then 
have the states decide how to control local pollution sources so as to meet those standards through 
state implementation plans.  See also id. at § 110.  The air quality criteria are supposed to 
“accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all 
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such 
pollution.  Id. at § 108(a)(2). 
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that when agencies evaluate the meaning of uncertain data to carry out such a 
command, costs should be considered. Failure to consider costs in this context 
is likely to produce economically inefficient regulations without foundation in 
any intelligible principle. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In making any policy decision, costs must be considered somewhere.  In a 
world of limited resources, no goal is ever attained to the maximum extent 
possible.  Even the achievement of such pressing, or imperative, goals as 
national defense, prevention of disease, or provision of an adequate level of 
education is subject to explicit or implicit cost constraints.  Environmental 
protection is no different.  The question is rather which level of government 
should make the fundamental judgment on defining social goals and how much 
to invest in pursuing them. 
A. Arguments Why Congress Should Consider the Costs of Achieving Goals 
and Agencies Should Not 
In confirmation of the point I just made, most of the arguments against 
considering cost in making regulatory decisions really boil down to the 
argument that Congress has already decided on a proper role for costs, and 
meant to exclude any agency second-guessing.  That is the way the opponents 
of considering costs in setting air quality standards in fact argued their point.  
A number of arguments why this approach is proper have been advanced.  I 
will list them from strongest to weakest (in my personal opinion). 
1. The Role of Congress 
It can well be argued that the ultimate, or even the secondary, goals of our 
society should not be selected through cost-benefit analysis even if cost 
judgments are proper in selecting the means.  Propositions such as “every child 
should master basic academic skills” or “the public health should be protected 
against damage from air pollution” can articulate legitimate goals regardless of 
the practicality of achieving them.  Congress as an elected body is far more 
suited than an agency to articulate such generic goals.  However, if goals are to 
be meaningful, Congress cannot stop simply at articulating them.  Since 
attaining each Congressional mandated goal requires resources that could be 
used to attain some other public or private goal, Congress must also specify at 
least in rough-cut form the “budget” of social resources to be invested in 
pursuing each such goal if its decision is to be meaningful. 
Such a system, in which Congress specifies basic public ends and (to some 
extent) the means for achieving them, is more politically responsible than a 
regime of universal cost-benefit analysis administered by agencies.  It is 
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probably more “transparent” as well, and provides greater opportunities for 
public involvement. 
2. Correcting Agency Inaction 
Agencies, it is often said, with considerable justification, have a bias 
against action, whether that action is needed to establish some new protection 
for the public, or to reform a misguided or obsolete program.  Some claim that 
unless Congress overcomes that bias with a strong command, nothing will get 
done. 
In a further, more debatable step, some argue that consideration of costs 
itself embodies a bias against action.  The costs of an action are far easier to 
quantify and appreciate than its benefits.  Therefore, laws must be structured to 
specifically downplay the role of costs in attaining a goal, or nothing will get 
done. 
3. Correcting the Political Balance 
Certain groups and interests, it is said, are underrepresented in our society.  
Precisely because of that underrepresentation, they are entitled to “seize the 
moment” and “lock in” a resolution favorable to their agenda. 
B. Arguments Against Setting Goals Without Considering Costs in Any Way 
1. The Relationship Between Congressional Goal-Setting and Agency 
Cost-Consideration 
The argument for generic Congressional specification of goals and 
“budgets” for achieving them in a way that cannot be defeated by agency cost-
benefit analysis has considerable force.  But even if we accept it, it does not 
show that consideration of costs should be banished from agency selection of 
the means for achieving that goal. For example, even if Congress states that air 
quality standards should be set without considering the costs of attainment or 
the benefits of compliance, that still does not mean that costs should be entirely 
banished from the setting of any individual standard. Let me explain this 
seeming paradox. 
Congress may be able to describe a social goal in generic terms and direct 
that it be attained without considering costs.  However, given the limits on 
congressional time and resources, the description of that goal will almost 
inevitably be general, and will often lack operational significance precisely 
because of its generality. In such circumstances, agencies will have to evaluate 
specific facts relevant to the generic Congressional command and issue 
particularized regulations that will become the actual focus of attainment 
efforts.  So, for example, Congress has specified that the public health must be 
protected with an “adequate margin of safety” against damage from all widely 
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occurring air pollutants,2 but it falls to EPA to give that language meaning by 
setting particular air quality standards, at particular numerical levels, for 
particular pollutants.3 
The data on which such standards must be based almost never points 
clearly to a given degree of harm at a given level of pollution.  Instead, it will 
depict a blur of probabilities.  Often, at any given pollution level, harm can 
neither be shown to exist nor shown to be absent, much less quantified 
precisely.  When data is uncertain in this manner, allowing the agency to rely 
on it to set particularized goals without considering costs or other practical 
consequences runs a real danger of making the agency decision “opaque” to 
outside analysis and review.  The abstract question when uncertain evidence of 
risk, considered all by itself, is an adequate basis for regulation is too elusive to 
be consistently answered.  Put another way, reliance on only those aspects of 
uncertain studies that argue for stricter regulation, without any consideration of 
most of the factors that might induce a reasonable decision-maker to reject 
such uncertain evidence, allows the agency to be risk-accepting or risk adverse 
at will without any defining principle.  In deciding whether to rely on uncertain 
data in ordinary life, we all take account of the costs of acting on it.  We would 
be far more likely to have a medical procedure to correct a given harm 
performed, rather than waiting for more tests, if that procedure were cheap and 
painless as opposed to costly and painful.  By ruling out such a common-sense 
approach to weighing uncertain data, a “no consideration of costs” approach 
can result in the delegation of even more arbitrary power to the agency than 
would result from a full-scale cost-benefit test. 
Once a particular goal has been set based on uncertain data, considering 
costs later, as a guide to, or restriction on, efforts to attain it provides a very 
imperfect fix to the problem just identified.  The essence of that problem is that 
the agency has arbitrary power to set the goal based on strong or weak data 
without regard to consequences.  Moderation in efforts to attain the goal is not 
responsive to this problem, since moderation might be appropriate to goals 
based on weak data but not to goals based on strong data. 
Particularized goals that do not consider costs in weighing the data are also 
likely to be economically inefficient.  The decision to set a standard based on 
uncertain data is properly analogized to the purchase of insurance.  But if we 
are precise about that analogy in the air quality standards context, the public 
health concerns identified in the uncertain studies is the risk insured against, 
while the costs and disruptions of implementing the standard are the price of 
the insurance.  In that context, one might well ask how we can “buy the 
insurance”—that is, set the standard—without evaluating as best we can both 
 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
 3. Id. 
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the risk being insured against and the cost of insurance—that is, the cost of the 
control efforts that an affirmative decision to regulate would trigger. 
2. Other Arguments Against Considering Costs 
The other arguments raised against agencies considering costs when they 
regulate are, to my mind, far less substantial than the first. 
 
 Agency Bias Against Action 
It is true that agencies often have a strong bias against action.  But that has 
nothing to do with whether they should consider costs or not. “Action forcing” 
devices can operate equally well with or without considering costs.  Action 
forcing devices consist of statutory deadlines for taking particular actions, such 
as promulgating regulations, and “hammer” provisions. The Clean Air Act is 
full of statutory deadlines. When such a deadline is missed, as it often is, it 
becomes enforceable by “citizen suit” under section 304 as a “nondiscretionary 
duty.”  A “hammer” provision states that if an agency does not act by a 
particular date, very undesirable consequences automatically follow. The 
prime example is in RCRA, where Congress provided that if treatment 
standards were not issued by particular dates, any disposal on land of the 
affected wastes would be forbidden. 
 
 Costs Are Easier to Quantify 
The notion that costs in the narrow financial sense are easier to quantify 
and have greater impact than benefits is certainly incomplete and may often be 
approximately the reverse of the truth.  Direct compliance costs are sometimes 
overestimated.  But often the major costs of compliance are “intangible”—
applying for and waiting for a permit, and the loss of staff time and disruption 
to production schedules if the permit is delayed.4  Most industries say that for 
most regulations, these “process costs” are far more significant than the direct 
costs of compliance. 
 
 Risks Should Be Balanced Against Costs 
Risks are not balanced against cost, measured as dollars spent for 
compliance, as often as you might think.  In most regulatory areas practically 
no provable health cost from a large industrial activity is acceptable, no matter 
what the costs of abating it.  Instead, such costs are considered in that context 
 
 4. Among its innovations, the 1990 Amendments instituted a national permit program, 
which had long been an integral part of the Clean Water Act, but lacking in the Clean Air Act.  
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661(a)–(f).  As of January 1998, state and local permitting authorities received 
nearly 14,000 applications for operating permits—representing more than 60% of the estimated 
22,000 sources subject to the Title V operating permit program nationwide.  ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR POLLUTION OPERATING PERMIT PROGRAM UPDATE (EPA/451/K-
98/002, Feb. 1998). 
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almost exclusively as an aid to deciding when to take action based on uncertain 
data of the sort described above. 
 
 Environmental Advocates Have No Power 
Contrary to any claims of powerlessness, environmental advocates have 
been extremely successful in obtaining the passage of legislation that imposes 
major compliance costs on industry without any cost benefit test.  But 
sometimes “costs” do not consist of anonymous balance sheet impacts, but 
changes to long-established life-styles and expectations.  People are far more 
reluctant to give up their freedom to drive when and where they wish, or use 
land as they wish, than they are to pay money. 
 
 The Impact of Public Opinion 
The practice of setting regulations without considering costs helps create a 
regulatory system that cannot deal with these primal elements of public 
opinion.  The inevitable pressure to consider costs somewhere tends to restrict 
regulations that do not consider costs to addressing activities, which can 
practicably be regulated without considering costs very much.  The result is a 
set of rules targeted on some, but not all, “major sources” of environmental 
damage.5  We can imagine a rule that requires major factories to abate the risks 
they create without regard to costs.  No such rule applicable to farmers can be 
imagined.  Yet farming, not factories, is now the country’s major source of 
water pollution.6  The political system, in its fixation on not considering costs, 
is on the path to trading away the prospect of rules that could address all 
sources of an environmental problem, precisely because they did so in a 
manner that was balanced across the board, for rules that have limited 
applicability precisely because of their unrealistic stringency. 
C. Application to the NAAQS Debate 
In the particular air quality standards context, the question whether 
Congress intended a full cost-benefit balancing test to establish NAAQS is 
something of a straw man.  The specific evidence against that is strong.  The 
 
 5. The Clean Air Act defines “major source” in various ways.  It is a source with the 
potential to emit more than ten tons a year of hazardous air pollutants or more than twenty-five 
tons per year of all hazardous air pollutants taken together, or a source in an “attainment area” 
with the potential to emit 250 or 100 tons a year, see CAA §169(1), or sources with smaller but 
still substantial emissions potentials in “nonattaiment” areas.  See, e.g., CAA §181. 
 6. Nonpoint source pollution remains the nation’s largest source of water quality problems 
today.  The latest National Water Quality Inventory indicates agriculture is the leading 
contributor to water quality impairments, degrading 60% of the impaired river miles and half of 
the impaired lake acreage surveyed by states, territories, and tribes.  NONPOINT SOURCE 
POLLUTION: THE NATION’S LARGEST WATER QUALITY PROBLEM (citing Water National Quality 
Inventory, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/facts/point1.htm. 
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real question is whether Congress denied costs (in the larger sense) any role in 
setting NAAQS.  The second is that the relevant statutory language directs 
EPA to set air quality standards that “protect the public health” with an 
“adequate margin of safety.”7  Under the rule laid down in the Chevron case,8 
EPA may consider costs in setting NAAQS unless the text of the statute makes 
“unmistakably clear” that Congress meant to bar cost consideration.9 
One might argue whether the reference to “public health” displayed that 
intent or not.  By contrast, I cannot think of any reasonable argument that the 
use of the term “adequate margin of safety” denotes intent to exclude costs.  A 
standard that incorporates a “margin of safety” is one that goes beyond 
addressing provable harms.  In common parlance, an “adequate margin” is one 
set after weighing all the consequences of a setting a lower standard than the 
“hard evidence” justifies, not a standard based on only a partial consideration 
of some of the consequences.  If a standard set to provide a “margin of safety” 
is insurance, then, for the reasons given above, that analogy, too, supports 
considering the “cost” of the “insurance.”  Moreover, the fact that costs can be 
weighed, for limited purposes, during the implementation process does nothing 
to show that Congress meant to rule out considering costs in setting the 
“margin of safety” because it does nothing to correct the defects that would 
arise from not considering them.  Those defects concern the establishment of a 
standard that does not rest on responsibly evaluated evidence and thus is thinly 
justified.  Moderation in the means for achieving such a standard does nothing 
to correct its basic defects. 
Apart from the plain meaning of the statutory language, the legislative 
history affirmatively suggests that costs and practical impacts should be 
considered in evaluating ambiguous data.  Discussing the original “margin of 
safety language,” the Senate Report on the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments 
said that “margins of safety are essential to any health-related environmental 
standards if a reasonable degree of protection is to be provided against hazards 
which research has not yet identified.”10  I cannot see any way to read the 
language directing the establishment of “reasonable” protection against 
“unidentified” hazards that would rule out consideration of costs as a matter of 
law.  On the contrary—if the risk is “unidentified” how other than by 
considering costs could the “reasonable” degree of protection be identified? 
When Congress amended the Act in 1977, it emphasized the importance of 
protecting public health, but made clear that “public health” protection did not 
embrace a “no-risk philosophy” because that “ignores all economic and social 
 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
 8. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 9. Id. at 842-43. 
 10. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 10 (1970). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
160 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:153 
consequences and is impractical.”11 But if Congress did not adopt the 
“impractical philosophy” of ignoring “all economic and social consequences” 
for setting NAAQS, then it must have intended economic and social 
consequences to be considered in some manner when NAAQS were 
established. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude with an open question.  If the evidence above shows that 
EPA is not precluded from considering costs in setting NAAQS, at least when 
it assesses the regulatory significance of uncertain data, does that mean that 
EPA may consider costs in that context, or that it must do so? 
In my tentative view, it means that EPA must consider them.  That is so 
because even if EPA has the legal freedom under Chevron not to consider 
these costs, the law also requires the agency in these circumstances to give a 
reasonable justification for refusing to consider them.  But precisely because 
considering costs in evaluating the meaning of uncertain data corresponds so 
precisely to how such decisions are ordinarily made in the absence of legal 
constraint, it is hard to see what justification EPA could offer for departing 
from that course if it could not rely on the trump card of legislative command. 
 
 
 11. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 127 (1977). 
